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11’HE quadrupling of OPEC oil prices in late 1973
and early 1974 had a profound and permanent impact
on the U.S. economy. The initial impact was an explo-
sion in the prices of most goods and services, as well
as the longest and most severe decline in national
output since the 1930s. The recession trough occurred
over two years ago and the rate of inflation has fallen
substantially since 1974. While the inflation rate re-
mains quite high by historical standards, the primary
focus of concern, at least in official circles, seems to
have shifted toward the persistence of an unaccepta-
bly high unemployment rate and the associated loss
of national output. More importantly, the mounting
concern over the immediate problem posed by un-
employment seems to have obscured the permanent
effect of the energy price revision.
The large increase in the price of energy in 1974
permanently reduced economic capacity, or the poten-
tial output of the U.S. economy, by four to five per~
cent. The productivity of existing capital and labor re-
sources was sharply reduced. Policy discussions which
fail to account for the permanence of these changes,
especially in the face of persistent unemployment,
contribute to an overstatement of the benefits to be
obtained from a conventional policy of aggregate de-
mand stimulus.
In order to clarify the gains which may be expected
from a stimulative economic policy and the accom-
panying inflation risks, it is useful to examine the
impact of the energy price revision on prices, produc-
tion and employment.1 To facilitate this discussion,
lMost of the discussion of the economic impact of the OPEC
action has focused upon its effects upon aggregate demand.
However, several recent studies have indicated that the na-
tion’s excess capacity may not he as large as some data shows.
Among these studies are: Denis S. Karoosky, “The Link Be-
tween Money ann Prices — 1971-76,” this Review (June
1976), pp. 17-23; A. Nicholas Filipello, “A Question of
Capacity,” Business and Government Outlook (Fall 1976),
pp. 1-3; and Barry Bosworth, “Capacity Creation in Basic-
Materials Industries,” Brooking.s Papers on Economic Acticity
(2:1976), pp. 297-341. A contrary view is presented by
Albert J. Eckstein and Dale M. Ileien, ‘Estimating Potential
Output for the U. S. Economy In a Model F’ramework,”
Aehiecing The Goals of the Employment Act of 1946— Thir-
tieth Amsiversary Review, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic
Committee, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., December 3, 1976,
pp. 1-25.
we will first develop the concept of a firm’s capacity
outpnt. This concept allows for analysis of the effects
of a change in the price of energy on a firm’s cost
structure, capacity output, employment, and product
price using a standard microeconomic model of the
firm. Such an analysis is basic to an understanding
of potential output and the transitional and perma-
nent impacts of the OPEC price actions since 1973.
Microeconomic.s and (.7a.vacitq Outj.n:t
The notion of economic capacity is fundamentally
a short-run concept. There is no limit to the output
a firm could produce efficiently if it could command
sufficient amounts of each of the resources it employs.
From a long-run perspective, an efficient firm would
tend to use more of each of the resources it employs
to produce at a higher output rate. However, some
resources are, as a practical matter, fixed or given for
some period into the future. This fixed nature of some
resources characterizes the short run. For any amount
of fixed resources only one output rate can be pro-
duced using an efficient long-run method. This out-
put rate is the economic capacity of the firm. Firms
have a cost-saving incentive to produce at capacity
output or to have an amount of fixed resources that
allow the production of their desired output at the
lowest cost possible.
The concept of a firm’s capacity may he seen more
clearly by looking at the cost structure of the hypo-
thetical firm of economic theory.i The cost structure
is derived from the “production function” of the firm
and the prices of resources used by the finn, such
as labor, capital and energy. A production function
defines the maximum output attainable given the
2
Sueh a cost structure is more fully discussed in the micro-
economic section of most principles of economics texts. A thor-
ough development of the cost structure ofthe firm may also he
found in C. E. Ferguson and S. Charles Maurice, Economic
Analysis, rev. ed. ( Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 1974), Chapters 6 and 7. pp. 161-232. The best discus-
sion and argument for the concept of economic capacity used
here is that by George Stigler, The Theory of Price, 3rd ed.
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), pp. 156-58.
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state of technology, for any set of resources.3 For
each rate of output, technology and the prices of re-
sources dictate the lowest cost method or combination
of resources required.
Figure I shows the relevant long-run and short-run
cost structure of the firm. In the long run, when the
firm is free to change the employment of all resources,
the unit cost or long-run average cost (LAG) of any
output rate is constant.4 Given the price of each
resource, the firm can choose the method of produc-
ing any output rate at the lowest total resource cost
or unit cost (C in Figure I). Any other output rate
could be produced by varying proportionately each of
the resources used with the lowest cost method. Since
total resources cost is also proportionate to resource
employment, unit cost (C) is independent of output.
In the long run, the cost of producing an additional
unit of output, the marginal cost, is the same as the





A Firm’s Cost Structure and the
Effect of a Higher Variable Resource Price
.SMC’
LAC
For any amount of fixed resources, the output rate
which can be produced with the minimum long-run
cost method is capacity output. In the short run, any
output, other than capacity, will require a higher cost
method of production than that indicated by the long-
run average cost. Thus, for any level of capital which
is fixed in the short run, the short-run average cost
of output, SAC, is above the long-run average cost
curve, except at the capacity output level.5 Of course,
the larger is the amount of capital the firm has, the
larger is its capacity output. In the short-run, higher
cost methods are required to obtain additional out-
put since only variable resources may be increased.
As output expands, each unit of a variable resource
has less of the fixed resource with which to work so
the productivity of variable resources declines. Cor-
respondingly, the cost of additional output, the short-
run marginal cost (SMC), rises as the output rate
expands. This cost is only the same as the long-run
tm’rhe production function is based upon technical ellicieney.
The more popular notion of capacity, the maximum output
attainable for a given set of resources is, by definition, in-
cluded in the production function and does not depend upon
resource prices.
~The production process, for simplicity, is assumed to be char-
acterized by “constant returns to scale,” or proportionate
changes in the use of each resource (change in scale) will
allow output to he changed proportionately
5
1’he SAC curve is U-shaped. At low rates of output, the major
component of cost is the cost of the fixenl resources. .ks output
expands, the firm “spreads its overhead” over more units pro-
ducing a larger output at a lower unit cost. As output is cx-
paisded beyond the capacity level, the unit cost of variable
resources becomes an increasing share of unit cost and the cost
effect of using higher cost (lower productivity) methods of





cost at the output which uses the optimal
method of production, or capacity output.
The cost structure is a major factor in the output
decision of a firm. For example, consider the profit
maximizing competitive firm which is a “price-taker,”
able to sell as much as it chooses at a given market
price. For such a firm, the relevant short-run supply
curve is the SMC curve in Figure I. For any given
market price, the firm maximizes profit by produe-
ing the output rate where marginal cost, SMC, equals
price.0 The cost structure is important in the long-
run as well. The firm will not continue operating in
an industry where losses (the inability to cover the
cost of using capital, labor, and energy resources) are
incurred. The minimum long-run supply price is (C)
in Figure I. Moreover, if the firm earns economic
profit in the short run, it has an incentive to expand
its capital and capacity output. In addition, the exist-
ence of economic profit attracts new firms into the
industry. As output expands, the product price tends
to fall to induce customers to buy the larger output.
°Technically,the short-run supply curve is only defined above
the niininium level of unit expenditures on variable resources.
If the market price were below this level, there would he no
output at which the firm could cover the cost of its variable
resources. The profit-seeking firm would shut down, restricting
losses to the cost of the fixed resources. Note also that if the
market price equals (C) in Figure 1, the firm maximizes profit
by producing the capacity output rate. While the finn “breaks
even” there, it earns a competitive rate of return on its capital
since this return is included in the unit fixed cost and SAC.
LAC’
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The product price will tend to fall to (C) where the
long-run incentive to expand capital and capacity
output is eliminated.~
The Determ.inant3’ of CapaCity Outpt.it
Capacity output is determined by the stock of capi-
tal which a firm has, and its long-run average cost.
The latter, in turn, depends upon the market price
of each resource employed and technology. Changes
in either resource prices or technology will change
the economically efficient means or production in the
long run and shifts the long-run average cost curve.
Moreover, such changes, except for a change in the
price of the fixed resource, will shift the firm’s short-
run supply,8
The effect of a one percent increase in the price
of a variable resource on the cost structure and capac-
ity output of a firm is also shown in Figure I. An
increase in the price of a resource raises the long-run
average cost and supply price of output. The extent
of the rise in long-run average cost depends upon the
share in total cost of the resource whose price has
increased. A change in the price of a resource whose
cost is a very minor proportion of total output cost
will have very little impact on unit cost, as compared
to a resource whose cost is a major share of unit cost.
In particular, each one percentage point rise in the
price of a resource will add K percent to the long-
run average cost, where K is the share of this re-
source in total costY For example, a one percent in-
crease in the market wage rate of workers in a firm
where labor costs account for half of total costs will
tend to raise the long-run unit cost by one-half of one
percent.
The short-run supply decision also is affected by
an increase in the price of a variable resource. An
increase in the price of a variable resource raises the
cost of the resources necessary to prodtice more otit-
put. Thus, the short-run marginal cost of output also
increases. Moreover, it increases more than short-run
~The concept of capacity is not restricted in its relevance to the
eases of competitive firms having constant—returns—to—scale pro-
duction processes. For any market structure and regardless of
returns to scale, any firm has a cost—saving incentive to manage
capital resources so that produetioms of any desired output
occurs at capacity’.
5
Since we are primarily concerned with the Sleet of changes in
resource prices on capacity, the analysis of technological
change is not pursued here.
°Arise in the price of capital increases capacity output. Fixed
costs (In not affect the marginal cost of output in the short
run. Since average cost, both short— annl lnng—rtm, rise,
capacity rises to the output level where long—run average cost
intersects the initial short—run marginal cost curve.
average cost.t° If there is more than one variable
resource, changes in the mix of variable resources
affect the size of the upward shift in each cost and
the result is more difficult to specify. However, when
the resource whose price increases is a “substitute”
for capital in the production process the analysis of
the simple case and the results depicted in Figure I
hold.” The percentage reduction in a firm’s capac-
ity output is identical to the percentage rise in its
long-run average cost. At the new capacity output,
the finn possesses its optimal amount of capital, given
the new set of resource prices, and it employs exactly
the capital and labor which were efficient before the
rise in the price of energy. Only energy employment
declines as capacity output declines,12
The effect of a rise in the price of a variable re-
source such as energy is to reduce capacity output
and raise the long-run supply price, the changes be-
ing greater, the greater is the share of energy in the
total cost of each product. Products which rely snore
heavily upon energy have larger losses in capacity
output and their long-run price is increased relatively
more than that of other goods.
Estimates of the Ch.ange in Manufacturing
Capa.city as ii. Re.mlt of the 1973-74
Change in .Ln..ergy Prices
The discussion above suggests that an estimate of
the capacity loss in U.S. manufacturing due to the
°Asisnple example illustrates why this is the case. Suppose
lal,or is the only variable resource in the short run. A given
percentage increase in the wage rate will proportionately
increase the cost of both the labor currently employed per
unit of output, and the labor necessary to produce an addi-
tional unit of output, the marginal cost. Since the fixed cost
of output is unchanged, the unit cost of any level of output
rises less than the percentage increase its labor costs. If each
firm initially operated at capacity output, the marginal cost
rises more than short—run average cost at that output, andl
capacity output declines.
~A resource is a “substitute” for capital, if efficient production
of some output requires that a rise in the price of the re-
source lo’vers the optimal emnplovsnent ratio of the resource
to capital. For example, energy and capital are substitutes if
a rise in the price of energy relative to that of capital services
causes the efficient firm to lower its employment of energy
per unit of capital services to produce a given rate of output.
‘
2
The results in this paragraph are derived in our unpub-
lished paper, “Firm Capacity and Factor Price Changes.”
The conclusions require that production is characterized by
a ‘‘partial elasticity of substitution” between energy and cap-
ital annl between energy and labor equal to one. This means
an X percent rise in the price of energy relative to the price
of capital (or labor) causes least—cost pronluction of any out-
put to require X percent less energy relative to capital (or
labor) employment. This appears to be an accurate charac-
terization for prorluctinn in nine industrial nations, including
the Uisitenl States. See J. M. Griffin and P. II. Gregory, “An
Jntercuuotry ‘Iranslog Model of Energy Substitution Re-
sponses,’ The American Economic Review ( Decensber
1976), pp. 845-57.
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sharp increase in the price of energy could be ob-
tained if measures were available on the change in
capacity by industries. The discussion of the micro-
economics of capacity indicates that information would
be required on parameters of the production func-
tions of these industries, and on the size of expendi-
tures on energy by industry, as well as a measure of
the increase in energy prices over the period. Unfor-
tunately, no complete set of estimates of the relevant
production function parameters by industry exists.
An alternative is to consider estimates of the pro-
duction function parameters for the aggregate of all
manufacturing. A recently published study, which
overcomes a number of statistical problems inherent
in previously published estimates, provides estimates
of the required information concerning the aggregate
production function for manufacturing in nine indus-
trial countries, including the United States.t3 This
study supports the conclusion above that the per-
centage response of capacity output to a one percent
change in the price of energy is just equal to the
share of energy costs in total factor costs. The study
suggests that this cost share was quite stable through-
out the 1960s at around twelve percent of total fac-
tor costs. Thus, an unexpected ten percent increase in
energy costs, given wages and the capital stock,
should produce approximately a 1.2 percent decrease
in capacity of the U.S. manufacturing sector.
The behavior of the price of energy relative to the
price of output is presented in Chart I, where a rela-
tive price index has been constructed by dividing the
wholesale price index for fuels, related products, and
power by the deflator for private business output,
adjusted to a basis of 1972 = 1.0. As can be seen
from the Chart, this relative price series trends down-
ward through the 1960s, is fairly stable from 1968
through 1972, rises sharply from the fourth quarter of
1973 through the third quarter of 1974, and then
becomes relatively stable around a value of 1.6 until
mid-1976. The wholesale price of energy increased
45.3 percent from the fourth quarter of 1973 through
October 1974. This increase, multiplied by a cost
share of 0.12 suggests a loss in manufacturing capacity
of about 5.4 percent.
13
5ee J. M. Griffin and P. R. Gregory, “An Interenuntry Trans-
log Model of Energy Substitution Responses.” They conclude
that production can be considered to be of the Cobb-Douglas
form in the energy resource. Their estimates are constructed
under the assumption of constant retums to scale. Under
these conditions, the partial elasticities of suhslitution be-
tween capital and energy and between labor and energy are












1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977
S,,,,,,. US U,p~ b’,,,d u_s c,
‘Tb, Wt,,I,soI, p,u,i,d,. ci i,,Is pcc,.c’.,i ‘ei,’,d p’cdc~’a~ii,~d,d by ‘he i,,pi,~t CUe,
D,f],t,. Ic,
to’,,’ dci, pbnd~Is, q,c,,,~ 1977 p,eii,,ei,o,r
1.7
Energy prices were not the only factor prices which
were observed to rise during this period. Over the
period (IV/1973 through 111/1974), actual hourly
compensation rose by 7.9 percent. According to the
Griffin and Gregory estimates, an increase of labor
costs of this magnitude in the manufacturing sector
of the U.S. economy should have reduced capacity
by an additional 0.4 percent. In total, the change in
economic capacity as a result of changes in factor
prices over this period of time can he estimated to
be on the order of five percent.”
It is generally accepted that the U.S. economy was
operating at effective capacity during the latter half
of 1973. The important question is where did the
economy operate relative to its new, lower, economic
capacity in the latter part of 1974. Employment in
sumn of the effects from energy price changes and \vage
changes is 5.8 percent. This estimate imnplicitly assumes that
the price of capital services remained unchanged over this
period. Alternatively, it could be assumed that the price of
capital services rose proportionally to the increase in wages.
Such an increase would offset (sec footnote 9) the computed
reduction in capacity by 1.4 percent, for a net reduction of
4.5 percent. The five percent reduction chosen above repre-

















Page 5FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MAY 1977
manufacturing declined by 1.8 percent from the fourth
quarter of 1973 through October 1974. Over the same
period, the average work week (of production work-
ers) in manufacturing declined by 1.5 percent for a
reduction in total hours per week of about three per-
cent. The Griffin-Gregory estimates suggest that the
reduction in capacity of the order of magnitude sug-
gested above should have been accompanied by a zero
to 1.5 percent reduction in employment. Given the
statistical error associated with the production func-
tion estimates, the data onthe behavior of employment
over this period appear to be roughly consistent with
a movement from one point of full capacity utiliza-
tion to a second point of full capacity utilization.
The Federal Reserve Board’s Index of Manufactur-
ing Capacity Utilization was 87.8 and 87.7 percent in
the last two quarters of 1973, respectively. By October
1974, the month immediately prior to the sharp drop
in industrial production and the sharp rise in unern-
ployment which characterized the rest of the 1973-75
recession, this index had fallen to 83.4 percent. If this
index does not capture the impact of changes in rela-
tive factor prices, and if the economy was operating at
full economic capacity in October 1974, then the index
should understate capacity utilization by the amount
of the capacity loss. The decline of the index to this
point in time is 5.1 percent which is the same order
of magnitude as suggested by the Griffin-Gregory
production function estimates.
175 Jff H ~ti fric (h’ ijs
on 11 ast.a’es at Capa.ci.ts-: tt?iization
A crucial question is whether or not the conven-
tional capacity utilization indices measure the impact
of a change in relative factor prices. There is no ques-
tion that the Wharton Index fails to measure such
effects, since it measures capacity by extrapolating
peak-output to peak-output trends.15 The Federal
Reserve Board Index is constructed by utilizing data
from periodic surveys on capacity utilization such as
the McGraw Hill capacity survey and interpolating
using the behavior of the Federal Reserve Industrial
Production index for manufacturing. As a result the
Federal Reserve capacity utilization index has two
general properties: (1) the cyclical movements ap-
proximate those of the industrial production index,
with the growth trend removed; and (2) the average
15
A description of this series may be found in F. Gerard Adams
and Robert Summers, “The Wharton Indexes of Capacity
Utilization: A Ten Year Penpective,” Proceedings of the
Business and Economic Statistics Section, 1973 (Washington,
D.C.: American Statistical Association, 1974), pp. 6i-72.
utilization rates over time and the long-term move-
ment in such rates are determined by the estimates
of utilization rates as reported in the various surveys.10
The important question is, therefore, whether the
survey data would pick up the change in the utiliza-
tion of economic capacity.
The concept of capacity which the surveys attempt
to measure has been labeled “maximum practical
capacity.”t7 This approach seems to ask how much
could be produced with existing facilities if they were
run under normal “full-tune” operating conditions. It
does not seem to ask whether such a level of opera-
tions would be efficient given existing factor prices.
This interpretation is reinforced by the testimony of
Mr. Douglas Greensvald of McGraw Hill before the
Joint Economic Committee. In discussing the notion
of capacity in the McGraw Hill Surveys he stated:
Thus it was decided to let companies set their own
definitions of capacity, and we only asked that the
respondents stick to their definitions. This, of course,
leaves open stich qnestions as ntunber of shifts of
operations, treatment of low grade, standby capacity,
and final assembly versus intermediate capacity. But,
in general, companies follow a commonsense defini-
tion of capacity, such as inaximuni output under
normal work conditions.
18
The authors of the description of the recent revision
of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) capacity utiliza-
tion index appear to agree that the concept of capac-
ity measured by the survey data does not capture the
effects of changes in relative factor prices: “This
version of capacity (maximum practical capacity) is
similar to our prior notion of engineering capacity in
that no explicit recognition is given to the effects of
changing price relation over the cycle.”t0 Thus, it
would appear that the measured indices would not
capture the impact of changes in economic capacity
as defined above, and that the measured utilization
indices would underestimate utilization by the amount
tm0
Federal Reserve Bulletin (November 1976), p. 894.
17
See Sureey of Current Business (July 1974), pp. 54-5. This
measure is defined as the maximum output which could be
produced using existing facilities while at the same time “fol-
lowing the company’s usual operating practices with respect
to the use of productive facilities, overtime, work shifts,
hohdays, etc.,” and assuming “product mix at capacity which
is most nearly similar to the composition of your actual
imtput.” Ibid, p. 50.
ThUS. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on
Economic Statistics, Measures of Productive Capacity, 79th
Cong., 2nd sess., May 14, 1962, p. 4.
01
L. Forest and R. Raddock, “Federal Reserve Measures of
Capacity Utilization,” unpublished memorandum, (Washing-
ton, D.C.; Division of Research and Statistics, Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, 1977), p. 13.
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of the factor price effect.2° Adjusting the Federal
Reserve Board index for October 1974 up by five
percent gives an estimated utilization rate of 87.6 per-
cent, essentially the same as in the fourth quarter of
1973.
Two strategies could be adopted for adjusting the
published figures since the end of 1974. It could be
assumed that the survey respondents gradually adjust
their concept of “normal operating conditions” over
time. In the near term it seems unlikely that this
would happen. First, the emphasis in the survey con-
struction is on historical conditions in the particular
industry. Second, the emphasis is on inertia: respond-
ents should choose whatever definition of normal op-
erating conditions they wish, but then they should
“stick to that definition.” Over a longer period of time,
some reduction in the bias of the measured index will
take place as the capital which suffered the capacity
loss depreciates, and is replaced by new capital. Chart
II is constructed assuming a constant downward ad-
justment in capacity as meastured by the Federal Re-
serve Board equal to five percent of the capacity
measure for October 1974. The revised capacity meas-
ure is divided into the industrial production index to
give the adjusted index of capacity utilization plotted
in the figure. It is difficult to know boxy to handle the
first three quarters of 1974, since the relative price of
energy was changing rapidly dining this period of
time, and since the published index of capacity utili-
zation is based on interpolations between the~.suirvey
dates. For lack of a better alternative, we show the
utilization rate as constant over these quarters.
/%&f1TO1Zt~tt?(IM.pociti/. Potenttot Outont.
(111.0 upplu
Construction of an aggregate or econom -wide
measure of capacity is not, in general, a straightfor-
ward adding of the capacity measures of the individ-
ual firms. The attempt by all firms to move to opera-
tions at their computed capacity levels, may cause
changes in factor prices. Such changes in factor prices
would shift all of the cost curves of the individual
85
firms and, hence, would alter capacity. The computa-
tion of aggregate capacity requires the summation of
the capacity estimates of all individual firms based
on the factor prices which would actually be realized
if all of the firms operated at their capacity level,21
Nevertheless, the aggregative problems may be par-
tially avoided and the effects of an energy price
change on United States production can he analyzed,
by proceeding in stepwise fashion. Assume that aggre-
gate output is produced by firms like the hypothetical
firm described above. Energy prices are, since late
1973. determined on a world market, so it can be
assumed that the United States faces a perfectly
elastic supply curve for this resource.22 Finally, as-
sume the labor supply curve of the traditional text-
book Keynesian model, namely that the aggregate
labor supply is perfectly elastic at a given nominal
wage rate, at least up to some “full-employment”
quantity. Under these circumstances the aggregation
problem discussed above is avoided, and the appro-
priate measure of aggregate economic capacity in the
model is the summation of the economic capacity of
the individual firms. Aggregate capacity is only one
point of the short-run aggregate supply curve of the
economy. Under the assumed conditions regarding
factor markets, it is possible to construct an aggregate
supply curve such as S,S, in Figure II, for the entire
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20The recent revisions in the FRB index might be cited as evi-
dence that this index captures sonic or most of the permanent
loss in capacity because of the change in the relative price
structure. An examination of the relationship between the
FRB index and the Wharton index before and since 1974
fails to provide any strong support for such a hypothesis. The
annual FRB capacity utilization index was regressed on the
annual Wharton capacity utilization index from 1951 through
1973. Linear and log-linear specifications were constructed
in level and first difference fnrms. When any of these specifi-
cations is used to simulate the F’RB index from 1974 through
1976, the prediction errors are less than one standard errur
from the actual value of the index in all three years.
2tThis problem is discussed hy Lawrence R. Klein, “Some
Theoretical Issues in the Measurement of Capacity,” Econo-
metrica (April 1960), pp. 272-86.
22
This is the traditional small-country assumption frequently
found in the international trarle literature. In this particular
market, it appears to he an appropriate description of be-
havior over the past few years. Initially we shall assume that
the nominal price of energy is given; in the next section this
assumption is altered to more accurately reflect the recent
situation where the relative price of energy is determined















short-run marginal cost curves across all firms.23 Thus,
along ~ nominal wages, W0, the nominal energy
price, P~ and the stock of capital, K0, are held
constant.
Au important constraint, for the aggregate econ-
omy, remains to be taken into account. The economy
is only a price taker in the labor market up to the
existing supply of labor or “full employment.” At-
tempts to expand output beyond that produced with
full utilization of capital and labor, result in higher
wages and prices with little or no impact on aggre-
gate production. This level of output is generally
referred to as “potential output.” It has become com-
mon to consider the aggregate supply curve being
vertical at potential output. Such a vertical segment
would occur along S~S~ in Figure II at the output X1,.
In the context of the discussion here, the appropri-
ate supply curve, once full utilization of labor ~s
reached, is not vertical. While attempts to expandout-
put beyond X~ result in higher wages and prices, with
2iChanges in one of the two variable factor prices still pose
aggregation problems. The results for the firm indicate that
an increase in the price of energy would reduce capacity out-
put and raise the long-run supply price of a product more,
the more important (as measured by the cost share) energy
is to production. Hence, relative commodity prices will be
affected in both the short run and long run due to the higher
energy price. We may abstract from the interindnstry
changes in relative prices and focus on potential output and
capacity changes by considering the aggregate production
function implicit in discussions of potential output.
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no additional labor or capital entering production, the
economy is free to expand its employment of energy
Given a nominal market price of energy higher out-
put prices can lead to increased output through the
use of more energy intensive operations The aggre
gate supply curve beyond X,, will be steep but not
vertical, as along S2 in Figure II.
Suppose that initially every firm is producing its
capacity output and the economy fully utilizes capita]
and labor, producing output X~,in Figure II at its
corresponding price level at the kink in the supply
curve S~S~ Au cx percent rise in the nominal price of
energy PE, will shift the aggregate supply curve The
shift in the S~segment of the aggregate supply curve
may be found by the same reasoning as applied to the
firm supply curve. The relevant parameter is the share
of energy K~in the tot’tl factor cost of aggregate
output Capacity output falls initially by K~percent
for each percentage point increase in P~. to XJ in
Figure II. Moreover, as in the ease of the firm, capital
and labor employment will be the same at Xa sat
X~ and the price level of this output will rise by a
percentage equal to the factor share, K5, for each
percentage point rise in P5 The reduction in output
is associated with a reduction in energy usage. Since
both capital and labor would be fully utilized at
output X~the kink in the new aggregate supply,
SSSI’, occurs at that output.
It should be noted that output X0 could still be
produced and would be, if the price of output were
sufficiently higher, at P~.If the output price and other
resource prices rise by precisely the percentage in-
crease in the nominal price of energy, firms would be
willing and able to produce exactly their original out-
put, X,,, utilizing the original methods of production.
An analysis of how this may come about is shown
in Figure III. As the supply curve shifts and the price
level rises above P0, less output will be demanded.
Policymakers may take actions such as monetary ex-
pansion to maintain real output at X2, by shifting ag-
gregate demand. While full employment would exist
at output X,~,policymakers might face pressures to
expand demand since output and the real return to
capital and labor owners will have fallen at price
level P5.
As the level of prices rises to P2, increased compe-
tition for fixed capital and labor resources raises their
nominal prices and shifts the ~i’ curve to S~The
higher price of output and other resources reduces
the relative price of energy, providing an incentive
to adjust energy employment back toward its original
(I .KEcc}XpFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MAY 1977
Figure III
Demand Management and a
Higher Nominal Energy Price
Aggregate
Output
rate of usage. Thus, to maintain real output at its
original level, commodity and factor prices must rise
by the same percentage as the increased energy cost
to restore all relative prices to their original values.
The two essential ingredients of this result are the
accommodative expansive demand management pol.
icy and the fixed and higher nominal price of energy
in world markets.
OPEC and Aggregate Ontpnt in the
United States
The relative price of energy presented in Chart I
indicates a large jump in late 1973 and 1974 which
has not been eroded by demand growth and increases
in the price level. In the analysis above, the relative
price of energy initially rises, but the accommodative
demand management policy is able to effectively
erode the gain to energy producers through inflation.
The relative price of energy is restored to its original
level.
The pricing actions of OPEC apparently were not
intended to be so easily frustrated. The relevant price
which OPEC is able to dictate as the dominant energy
producer is the price of energy relative to that of
output. Attempts by U.S. firms to move along the 5,’
curve in Figure III are frustrated by further increases
in the nominal price of energy. The appropriate ag-
gregate restriction on the supply curve S~(or Si’) is
not that indicated by 5, (or S,’). Instead, after the
institutional change imposed on the world energy
Price level
Figure IV
Aggregate Supply and the
Effect of a Higher Relative Price of Energy
sgg regale
Output
market, the appropriate restriction is a given relative
price of energy. Given this relative price and an exist-
ing amount of capital, full utilization of labor occurs
at a price level where labor costs relative to output
prices warrant hiring all the labor available. Increases
in output prices, beyond this point, result in no in-
centive to expand energy employment and merely bid
up the nominal prices of the fully employed labor,
capital, and energy. Such a supply restriction implies
the vertical segment of the aggregate supply curve
discussed earlier. In Figure IV, this supply restriction
is depicted as 5, at the capacity output level, X~.The
aggregate supply curve is 5,5,.
An increase in the nominal price of energy raises
the 5,5, segment of aggregate supply in precisely the
same manner and amount as in Figure II. Again, at
output Xi,’ and price level P,, there is the same utiliza-
tion of capital and labor as at X~.However, in this
case, the new relative price of energy shifts the verti-
cal segment of the aggregate curve to S~Thus, there
is no price level at which the economy may produce
its original level of potential output. Both capacity
output and potential output fall to X~if excess de-
mand exists at P1. or if policymakers create an excess
demand at price P, through expansionary policy,
nothing happens to aggregate output. In such situa-
tions, the price level will simply rise inducing em-
ployers to bid up nominal resource prices for the
fully-employed capital and labor resources as well as
the dollar prices of energy.
x~ x~
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The increased relative price of energy, according
to this analysis, caused a permanently higher level of
prices and permanent reduction in potential output,
as well as reducing firms’ capacity output and alter-
ing relative commodity prices. These effects occur in-
dependently of changes in the level of employment
of labor and capital and may not he offset by demand
management policies. The only way to recover the
loss in potential output and capacity would he the
restoration of the prior relative price of energy.24
Data on potential outptit, recently constructed by
the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), indicate
that the economy was operating essentially at its po-
tential in late 1973. Table I shows potential output
and actual real GNP (1972 dollars) since IV/l973.
From IV/l973 to IV/l974, real output fell 4.1 percent
(about $51 billion) while potential GNP was esti-
mated to rise 3.5 percent or about $44 billion. Thus,
in the fourth quarter of 1974, there is an estimated
“gap” of $96.7 billion.
The Loss of Potential Output in 1974
and the Economic Ou.tlook
T bet
Off cat
F’ Fe net GNP Ac eel GNP
(197 4otk sI (1972 detlars)
1973 I 12443 12426
1974 I 255 12304
U 2662 1220.8
it 12772 i212~
iv i 88.4 11917
1975 I 12997 1161 1
11 1311 1 11771
Ut 13 6 32093
IV 13 41 12192
1976 I 13458 1246.3
It i3 76 12600
ttl 1369$ 1 722
IV 13815 12a04
So a lit da I IS I nan
The growth inpotential output reflects growth in the
labor force, adjusted for its age sex composition and
growth in the capital stock over the year In particu-
lar, the estimate assumes constant or trend growth in
240f course over tim labor fo,c growth and capital accumu-
lation would incr ase potential output so that esentually the
old level of potential outp it is re tored. The conclusion
abo-se i that the labor a d capital c. isting at any time could
pioduce a larg r potential output, in the absence of th
energy price increas
‘II







productivity of resources. Thus, the potential esti-
mates do not include changes in potential output due
to a change in the relative price of energy and the
consequent decline in the productivity of capital and
labor described above.25
Since some growth in the capital stock occurred in
1974, it may be inferred that the effect of the OPEC
mandated energy price change (IV/1973 to IV/1974)
reduced U.S. capacity and potential output by more
than the actual 4.1 percent decline in real output. An
estimate of five percent is roughly the order of magni-
tude indicated by a inonetarist model of 1974 price
and output developments.26
Afive percent estimate of the loss in potential output
or reduction in the productivity of capital and labor
resources is also the correct size to explain an “output
~~TheCouncil of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the
President, 1977, pp. 52-5, indicates an a%vareness of this
permanent decline in productivity, and even suggests the
magnitude of the decline in potential output to be about
830 billion (1972 dollars) by 1976. The CEA indicates that
over the near term, productivity data should demonstrate
whether or not the productivity decline is permanent, and
that such proof will determine the need for a revision of
its estimates of potential CNP.
20
Sce Karnosky, “The Link Between Money and Prices.”
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gap” recently noted by the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) 21 The CBO pointed out that, after six
quarters of recovery, real GNP was about five percent-
age points below the rate indicated by the experience
in prior recoveries. Furthermore, the CBO attributes
two percentage points of the unusually high unem-
ployment rate to this output gap.28
Chart III shows the pattern of previous recessions
and recoveries discussed by the CBO. Real GNP is
measured relative to its rate at the prior cyclical peak
and an average of this index of output is given for the
four prior recession-recovery periods. The chart shows
that on average, after six quarters of recovery, real
GNP was 7.5 percent above its rate at the cyclical
peak. In contrast, output was only 2.4 percent higher
than the prior cyclical peak after six quarters of the
most recent recovery. The difference of about five per-
cent in this pattern since the recession trough (1/1975)
is called the “persisting output gap” by the CBO.
Chart IV shows the corresponding developments
for civilian employment. The employment pattern in
the recent recovery is not different from that of prior
recoveries. The shortfall of output is not associated
with a shortfall of employment. Recent unemployment
experience is not explained by unusual employment
developments but rather is apparently due to unusual
labor force behavior. Thus, it appears that the “output
gap” might better be termed a “productivity gap.”
The decline in labor productivity of about five percent
would be expected due to the impact on actual and
potential output of the higher relative price of energy.
A more conservative estimate of the loss in potential
output may be found using the earlier evidence on
the loss of economic capacity in manufacturing. About
20 percent of real GNP is comprised of compensation
of government employees, output originating in the
rest of the world, and output produced by the resi-
dential housing stock, There is little reason to expect
that these components of output are as severely lim-
ited by the change in the energy price as the output
of the rest of the economy. Assuming the manufactur-
ing result is representative for the remainder of the
private economy, a conservative estimate of the loss
in potential output is four percent.
The theory above indicates that the rise in the
relative price of energy would cause a percentage rise
in the minimum price level associated with potential
21U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, The Disappoint-
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output, equal in size to the percentage loss in poten-
tial output. Thus, a minimum four percent and per-
haps a five percent rise in the price level over 1974
would be expected based upon supply considerations
alone. The actual rateof price increase, as measured
by the GNP deflator, was 11.5 percent. If roughly four
percentage points of this increase is accounted for by
the one-time price level effect of the increase in the
relative price of energy, the remainder, 7.5 percent,
must be accounted for by other factors, such as
growth in aggregate demand.
The impact of a four percent reduction in potential
GNP may be seen in Chart V, which measures actual
real CNP relative to potential output with and with-
out the four percent reduction. The Chart indicates
that in the fourth quarter of last year the economy was
producing 92.6 percent of the CEA’s measure of po-
tential output. To account for the effect of the energy
price change, the CEA estimate of potential output
is lowered after the fourth quarter of 1973 so that,
by the fourth quarter of 1974, potential output is four
percent lower. The CEA estimate of the growth rate
of potential output (3,5 percent) is maintained in the
adjusted curve after the fourth quarter of 1974. As
the Chart indicates, by the end of 1976 the economy
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was producing 96.5 percent of potential output or the
gap is less than half as large as the official measures
indicate.
Recent policy discussions seem to assume that de-
mand management policies can close the official gap.
Obviously, policy measures which are sufficient for
this size task would be far too great for the resources
at hand. The biggest output gain achievable through
stabilization policy is about $46 billion in the fourth
quarter of 1976. Attempts to close the official gap of
over $100 billion reflect a failure to recognize that the
Perc;;~ implied production rate is unattainable and that such
efforts will add to the rate of price increase.
More importantly, Chart V illustrates the import-
ance of accounting for the loss in potential output
in assessing both the prospects for closing the gap,
100 and the desirability of policy stimulus. How quickly
the gap closes depends upon the rate of growth of
actual output. In Chart V each measure of potential
“ output grows at 3.5 percent and actual real GNP is
allowed to grow at a six percent annual rate, a growth
90 goal which has been the subject of considerable re-
cent discussion. When account is taken of the effect
of the energy price increase on potential output, the
0 Chart indicates that six percent growth closes the gap
early next year. Of course, beyond that point real
output growth would be limited to the 3.5 percent
growth in potential output. If the official estimates of
~ potential output are correct, achieving the growth
goal would not close the gap until 1980. Thus, much
of the current debate over the need for fiscal stimulus
rests upon an awareness of the permanent loss in po-
tential output since 1973.29
29
Even if real output grows at about a five percent annual rate,
less than the average annual rate of growth of real output
achieved dnring the recovery (1/1975 to IV/1976), the gap
would be eliminated by the end of next year, rather than






Excluding (fled of Energy Prices on Potential 61W’
m -Y —
Page 12